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GERALD BEER inequality inherent therein. The progressivity of a tax with respect to this particular income distribution is then gauged by the improvement of this index after the tax burden has been deducted. The pioneering treatise on the measurement of inequality in income is due to Dalton [2] . Dalton preferred the relative standard deviation (coefficient of variation) and the relative mean difference (Gini ratio) to the other measures which he considered. In this article we will use the Gini ratio exclusively to measure the dispersion of income. The Gini ratio G for a population of n individuals with incomes y u y 2 , , y n is defined by
If we list these individuals in ascending order of income, we may write n
Σ Σ y« -Λ A
It is well known that this index is exactly four times the value of the Gini coefficient, defined as the area between the Lorenz curve for the distribution of incomes and the line of perfect equality [5] . Clearly a proportional tax transforms a fixed income distribution into a different one without altering the original Gini ratio, since the relative disparity in incomes is not changed. We shall call a tax redistributiυe with respect to a particular income population if the Gini ratio for the post-tax income distribution is smaller than the Gini ratio for the pre-tax income distribution. A tax may be redistributive with respect to some income distributions, but not with respect to others. It appears that a progressive tax can only improve the Gini ratio, but this is not trivial to verify. It suffices to establish the following result.
THEOREM. Let y u
, y n and r u , r n be positive numbers having the following properties whenever i > j: (1) r, ^ η (2) y, ^ y y (3) r.y, g ηyj. Then the Gini ratio for the income distribution y u , y n is not less than the Gini ratio for the income distribution r λ y u , r n y n .
The following lemma is crucial in the proof. 
n n
Σ w Σ y«
Since r^-^ r 7 y ; whenever i >/, for i = 1, , n we have X^^y,--/j yy Γ iΣ/^ y, -y ; . Hence to establish (1), we need only show that 
7=1
The first expression on the right side of (4) is nonpositive, whereas (i -fc)y,y k ^ y k Σ ii y 7 since y, ^ y y for / = fc, -, i -1. Hence (3) . is established and the theorem is proved.
Tax progressivity and inflation.
Tax liability is a function of nominal income, income measured in dollars rather than the ability to command goods and services. Let us refer to the nominal dollars of a fixed base year as real dollars. To analyze the impact of pure inflation on a progressive personal income tax, we make certain restrictive assumptions about our population and the characteristics of our tax. We assume an unchanged distribution of real income from year to year. In particular, we insist that the relative distribution of nominal income is not altered by the inflation and that the economy experiences no real growth. We assume that the treatment of a particular nominal income class by the tax structure throughout the inflationary period is time invariant. Thus if an average income earner with nominal income y pays a tax T(y) in a fixed year, an income earner with the same nominal (but lower real) income would pay the same tax in subsequent years.
Suppose that the price level has risen by a factor of c > 1, and T(y) is the tax liability for an individual with nominal income y determined by a progressive tax operative since the base year. At this time cy nominal dollars command the same economic power as y real dollars; such an income determines a tax liability of (l/c)T(cy) real dollars. Since A τ is an increasing function, we have Hence, each taxpayer's real tax liability can only increase. After inflation, real post-tax income corresponding to real pre-tax income y is simply y -(l/c)T(cy). This may be expressed as (5) This formulation allows one to view inflation coupled with a progressive tax as a composition of taxes applied to real pre-tax income. Initially, the tax structure independent of inflation reduces each income y to y -T(y). Then, inflation in conjunction with the tax structure reduces this new income figure by a fraction of itself as displayed in (5) . A priori, one cannot say how this fraction varies with y -T(y). If the original tax were geared to produce a post-tax income distribution with a prescribed Gini ratio in the base year, it is desirable that this property be inflation neutral. If T(cy)-cT(y)/y -T(y) does not depend on income but only on the value of the dollar determined by c, then the inflation induced component of the tax will be proportional. Thus the redistributivity of the tax in the base year as measured by the Gini ratio of the post-tax income distribution is unchanged by inflation. In this case we can write
y ' y-τ(y) •
We now characterize those progressive tax functions of this form assuming the differentiability of h and T. Differentiating with respect to c, we obtain for all y. If k λ < -1, then the tax is regressive; if k x = -1, then it is proportional. If k λ is nonnegative, then the tax will be confiscatory at all levels of income, for T'(y) ^ 1 for all y. Only when -1< k γ < 0 is the tax progressive and nonconfiscatory. In this case the tax function yields a negative income tax on sufficiently low incomes. As one might expect, these tax structures are those for which the elasticity of post-tax income with respect to pre-tax income is constant.
If the steepness of the effective tax rate curve is used to measure progressivity, then we can again characterize those tax functions whose progressivity is inflation neutral. Let S denote the tax function arising from the tax function T distorted by inflation. At each level of real income y, it is obvious that S(y) = (l/c)T(cy). Denoting the corresponding effective tax rate function by A s , we have A s (y) = A τ (cy), so that A's(y)= cA'j{cy). The quantity A£(y) indicates the steepness of the distorted effective tax rate curve at real income y.
If the progressivity of T is to be invariant under a change in the price level in the above sense, we must have for all positive c and y Setting y = 1 yields A 'τ(y) = (1/y )A ^(1). We can now solve for the tax function T in the following equation:
(7)
Rewriting this in the form Γ'(y)-Γ(y)/y = k x and using the integrating factor 1/y we obtain T(y)=fe 1 ylny + fe 2 y. From (7) we note that T is progressive if and only if k x is positive, and in the present context k λ measures the progressivity of T.
The steepness of the marginal tax rate curve for the tax function 5 is given by S"(y) = cT"{cy). Thus the steepness of the original marginal tax rate curve is not altered if T"(y) = cT"(cy), and it follows that Γ"(y)= kjy. The general solution for T is now easily produced:
Notice that if k 3 = 0, then such a tax function's progressivity is inflation neutral with respect to both the effective and marginal tax rate curves. For small incomes a negative income tax is obtained, but lim y^o + T(y) = 0. Unfortunately, a far more aesthetically unpleasant observation must be made: the tax becomes confiscatory at high income levels. For fixed c the right side of (8) is a strictly increasing function of income, assuming that the tax is never confiscatory. From (5) it follows that the inflation modified exponential tax function can be viewed as the composition of T followed by a progressive tax function. Thus, for each pre-tax income distribution in the base year, the Gini ratio for the corresponding post-tax income distribution before inflation exceeds the Gini ratio for the post-tax income distribution after inflation. Thus the inflation distorted tax does a better job of redistributing income. In addition, the steepness of the effective tax rate curve and the marginal tax rate curve attributed to T is increased at each level of real income. If S again denotes T transformed by inflation by a factor oϊ c, then at each value of real income y The exponential tax curve does not approximate the actual tax curve particularly well at very high income levels; indeed, it must become confiscatory at the highest levels. Thus, the above reasoning probably is inappropriate for gauging the impact of inflation on progressivity over a long period since a sizeable segment of the population will secure these large nominal incomes. Nevertheless, the claim that the rich are more heavily penalized by an existing progressive tax in an inflationary period is well-founded, for a large percentage of the taxable income that accrues to the rich vis-a-vis capital gains and interest income is simply illusory.
